Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

This review concerns a number of amendments to Federal Law "On insolvency"1 (the "Law") introduced by federal laws No. 222-FZ2 and No. 488-FZ3, and the interpretation of the amendments in the Review of Court Practice on Matters Related to Participation of State Authorities in Insolvency Proceedings and Procedures Applicable in these Proceedings, approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 20 December 2016 (the "Review").

This review covers the following most important amendments:

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

In Russian insolvency procedures, it is quite common for third parties to try to exclude property from a debtor’s insolvent estate (konkursnaya massa) by claiming title to its real property in the absence of the registered title. These third parties may refer to the agreements that had been made prior to the commencement of the insolvency procedure as well as to the actual transfer of property to them.

Introduction

On 25 July 2016, the White & Case team obtained, at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (the "Supreme Court"), a declaration that a secured creditor has the right to reduce, at its discretion, the amount of a secured claim during receivership and, as a consequence, the right to vote at meetings of the debtor's creditors.

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).

Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.¹ In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w