The recent High Court judgment in Re CGL Realisations Limited (In Liquidation) in favour of Geoff Carton-Kelly as additional liquidator of failed electrical retailer Comet ordered the company’s former French parent, Darty, to pay over £100m to restore the preferential repayment of an intercompany loan owed to Darty in the run-up to Comet’s sale shortly before its insolvency. The additional liquidator was appointed in 2018 by the court specifically to investigate the circumstances of Comet’s sale in advance of its demise in 2012.

The costs regime in insolvency litigation is outdated and not fit for purpose, especially when it comes to the clawback claims designed to allow officeholders to restore the insolvent estate when assets have been deliberately dissipated. Many such claims can become uneconomical to run, especially where recipients of dissipated assets have no desire to preserve them but every incentive to diminish them with their own costs. Often a sale or assignment is the last resort to seek justice against wrongdoers in such situations.

Another interesting summary in the Times reporting on the staggering levels of fraud committed against the UK taxpayer during the pandemic. Whilst the Insolvency Service are clearly doing their best to hold fraudsters to account through disqualification orders and similar punitive measures, it appears that we are no closer to a financial recovery of any meaningful value, or at the very least imposing real financial pain on those who took advantage of the country’s generosity in the face of the unprecedented challenges of the Covid pandemic.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.