The amendment to art. 90(1)(6) of the Insolvency Act 22/2003 (abbrev. LCON) by the Public Sector (Legal Regime) Act 40/2015 was welcomed almost enthusiastically by most market agents. It was felt that the inconsistent treatment bestowed on pledges of future claims (hereinafter, ‘PFC’) would finally be a thing of the past. I myself am not altogether convinced that this is the case, being able to envisage more than one way an insolvency judge, averse to this type of security interests, can dampen the aforementioned enthusiasm by way of a not overly absurd interpretation of the new provision.
1. El artículo 1.1C del reglamento. Valoración
1. Art. 1(1)(c) of the Regulation. Appraisal
1. The characterisation of art. 1(1) ERIP and role of the Annex
Presumption, time limit for change of registered office and rationale behind the rule
La presunción, el tiempo del traslado social y la ratio de la norma
The rule
In homologated refinancing agreements
En la disposición final tercera del Real Decreto Ley 6/2013, sin conexión evidente con el objeto principal de la norma, se introducen modificaciones en el artículo 36.4 de la Ley 9/2012 (de reestructuración de entidades de crédito), con el propósito de fortalecer la posición jurídica de la SAREB como adquirente masivo de los activos tóxicos de las entidades intervenidas.
1. El supuesto de hecho
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago has issued a decision with significant implications for licensees of trademarks whose licensors become debtors in bankruptcy. In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, the Court considered whether rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy deprives the licensee of the right to use the licensed mark.1 Disagreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.