The judgment of Chief ICC Judge Briggs in Becker (A Bankrupt) v Ford & Ors [2024] EWHC 1001 (Ch) provides a useful summary of the matters to which the court should have regard when considering an application to lift the suspension of a bankrupt’s discharge.

ICC Judge Mullen’s judgment in Sriram v Revenue & Customs & Anor [2024] EWHC 853 (Ch) follows an application by the bankrupt, Ms Sriram, to annul a bankruptcy order made against her on a petition of HMRC in circumstances in which proper service of both the statutory demand and the petition was contested and in which her capacity to understand the proceedings against her was also in issue.

The recent judgment of HHJ Richard Williams, sitting as a High Court Judge, in Loveridge v Povey & Ors [2024] EWHC 329 (Ch) deals with what he described as a bitter dispute over the Loveridge family business. The business concerned was the operation of caravan parks in Worcestershire, Warwickshire and Shropshire, in part through five companies, and in part through three partnerships at will. The companies made use of interest-free inter-company loans repayable on demand

The case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and Ors has had a long and tortuous history, culminating in a Supreme Court decision which has now been handed down over a year after a two day hearing in May last year ([2022] UKSC 25). The bare facts can be simply stated.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by