Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Deputy ICC Judge Curl KC’s judgment in Wade & Anor v Singh & Ors [2024] EWHC 1203 (Ch) follows applications by the liquidators of MSD Cash & Carry plc to enforce charging orders over a number of properties owned by the defendants, all of them members of the same family. The main protagonists were Mohinder Singh, Surjit Singh Deol and Raminder Kaur Deol, Mohinder being the father of Surjit, and Raminder, married to Surjit. The estate of a deceased family member was added as a party.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

King v Bar Mutual Indemnity Fund [2023] EWHC 1408 (Ch) deals with a number of bases on which Susan King, James King and Anthony King each applied to set aside statutory demands for £219,700.00 made by the Bar Mutual Indemnity Fund. That sum was payable under an interim costs order made against the Kings by Cockerill J following a successful strike out of conspiracy proceedings. Those in turn arose out of a misrepresentation case.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by