Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

Verkopers en leveranciers van roerende goederen kunnen problemen met slecht betalende klanten voorkomen via een beding van eigendomsvoorbehoud.

Met dit beding kan men namelijk contractueel bepalen dat het eigendomsrecht op een bepaald goed pas overgaat nadat de derde-verkrijger er de prijs volledig van heeft betaald.

Les vendeurs et les fournisseurs de biens mobiliers peuvent faire face aux problèmes rencontrés avec des clients mauvais payeurs par l’insertion d’une clause de réserve de propriété.

Par cette clause, il peut notamment être prévu contractuellement que le droit de propriété d'un certain bien ne sera transféré qu'après paiement intégral du prix par l’acheteur.

Sellers and suppliers of movable assets can avoid problems caused by poorly-paying customers through a retention of title clause.

This clause makes it contractually possible to stipulate that ownership of a certain good does not transfer until the purchaser has paid the full price.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.