It is a cornerstone of English insolvency law and practice that creditors of a company in financial difficulty should share rateably (“pari passu”) in that company's assets. Put at its simplest, creditors with security should be paid before creditors with no security and unsecured creditors should share rateably between each other. Where an unconnected and unsecured creditor is paid before another creditor in the same category, that payment risks being set aside as a "preference", should the company subsequently enter liquidation or administration. But when does a preference occur?

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2022] UKSC 25 is a significant decision for the law of directors’ duties.

The Autumn budget will have done little to ease the concerns of companies facing significant trading pressures as the country tries to get back on its feet following the pandemic, the ongoing effects of Brexit, the Ukraine conflict and the current cost of living crisis. Inflation has now topped its forecasted peak at 11.1%; there are soaring energy prices and the UK is now officially in recession.

On 5 October 2022, the Supreme Court delivered its long awaited judgment in BTI 2014 LLC V Sequana SA [2022] UKSC 25 dismissing an appeal by BTI. Lord Reed and Lady Arden each gave their own judgments which concurred, largely applying the same reasoning, with the judgment of Lord Briggs with whom Lord Kitchen and Lord Hodge agreed.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by