The Employment (Collective Redundancies and Miscellaneous Provisions) and Companies (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act) came into effect on 1 July 2024.

Following on from the UK Supreme Court decision in Sequana (discussed here), the recent UK High Court (UKHC) decision in Hunt v Singh [2023] EWHC 1784 (Ch), further considered the duty of directors to take into account the interests of creditors in certain circumstances.

The High Court (Court) recently dismissed a petition seeking the winding up of a biofuel company (Company).

The ex tempore judgment is of note because it considers the standing of the Petitioner to bring the application and the consequences of a relevant witness not being cross-examined by the Petitioner on his affidavit evidence regarding the solvency of the Company.

Background

The scheme of arrangement (Rescue Plan) prepared by the examiner of Mac Interiors Limited (Company) has not been approved by the High Court following strong objections from the Revenue Commissioners (Revenue).

In its challenge, Revenue argued that there had been an error in “class composition” or, in other words, an error in the classification of creditors that voted on the Rescue Plan.

Class Composition

A previously unsettled aspect regarding the High Court’s (Court) jurisdiction to appoint an examiner to a company which is not formed or registered under the Companies Act 2014 (2014 Act), has been considered in the recent case of In the matter of MAC Interiors Ltd [2023] IEHC 395.

Earlier this year, a group of bondholders advised by William Fry and owed over US$175m by GTLK Europe DAC (GTLK Europe) and GTLK Europe Capital DAC (GTLK Capital) (collectively the Companies) petitioned for the winding up of the Companies on a number of grounds, including that they had failed to discharge scheduled interest payments and the accelerated debt constituted by the bonds following the interest payment defaults.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtors’ attempt to shield contributions to a 401(k) retirement account from “projected disposable income,” therefore making such amounts inaccessible to the debtors’ creditors.^[1] For the reasons explained below, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtors’ arguments.

Case Background

A statute must be interpreted and enforced as written, regardless, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, “of whether a court likes the results of that application in a particular case.” That legal maxim guided the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in a recent decision^[1] in a case involving a Chapter 13 debtor’s repeated filings and requests for dismissal of his bankruptcy cases in order to avoid foreclosure of his home.

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

When an individual files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the debtor’s non-exempt assets become property of the estate that is used to pay creditors. “Property of the estate” is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, so a disputed question in many cases is: What assets are, in fact, available to creditors?