2025年8月11日，香港高等法院法官陈静芬对华南城控股有限公司（以下简称“华南城”）下达清盘令。根据路透社报道，华南城是自2021年中国房地产行业陷入债务危机以来，首家在香港被清盘的国有背景房地产开发商。

背景

华南城及其子公司集团（以下简称“集团公司”）是在内地8个主要城市以品牌名称“华南城”运营大型综合物流与交易中心的房地产开发商。

此前，香港法院已两次延期华南城清盘申请的聆讯，然而，香港法院拒绝了本案聆讯的第三次延期请求，并基于以下理由，勒令华南城即时清盘：

On 11 August 2025, the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan made a winding up order against China South City Holdings Ltd (the “Company”). According to Reuters, this is the first state-backed property developer to be wound up in Hong Kong since the Chinese property sector tipped into debt crisis in 2021.

Background

The Company and its group of subsidiaries (the “Group”) is a real estate developer and operates a large scale integrated logistics and trade centre in 8 major cities in the Mainland under the brand name “華南城”.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

The concept of “property of the estate” is important in bankruptcy because it determines what property can be used or distributed for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. Defined by section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, “property of the estate” broadly encompasses the debtor’s interests in property, with certain additions and exceptions provided for in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Difficult questions can arise in a contractual relationship between a debtor and a counterparty about whether an entity actually owns a particular asset or merely has some contractual right.