Judge Parker of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas recently issued an order in the case of Hilltop SPV, LLC, granting debtor Hilltop SPV LLC’s (“Hilltop”) motion to reject a Gas Gathering Agreement (“GGA”) with counter-party Monarch Midstream, LLC (“Monarch”).[1] This decision allows Hilltop to reject the GGA while allowing Monarch to retain the covenants that run with the land post-rejection.

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2017 (June 27, 2024)

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

The U.S. Supreme Court held last week in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. that an insurance company with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” with the right to object to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.

Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

Purchasers often relish the prospect of buying distressed assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a buyer may obtain ownership of bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear of any interest” (assuming certain conditions are met), and also be reasonably confident that the sale will not be reversed on appeal. But the U.S. Supreme Court may have now tempered that confidence. In its recent, unanimous opinion, MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, No. 21-1270 (Apr.