On 26 February 2025, Deputy Master Scher handed down judgment in the case Suman Bhatia v Christopher Purkiss, as liquidator of JD Group Limited [2025] EWHC 359 (Ch). Wedlake Bell LLP (partner Edward Saunders), and Nora Wannagat (Tanfield Chambers) acted for the successful liquidator.

A copy of the judgment is available here.

Background

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

In December 2012, Halimeda International Ltd lent $140m to Sian Participation Corp. The loan agreement provided that any claim, dispute or difference of whatever nature arising under, out of or in connection with the loan should be referred to arbitration. In September 2020, in proceedings akin to a winding up petition, Halimeda applied to have liquidators appointed over Sian under the BVI Insolvency Act 2003. Wallbank J held that Sian had failed to show that the debt was disputed on genuine and substantial grounds and ordered that the company be put into liquidation.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

Official Receiver v Kelly (Re Walmley Ash Ltd and Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986) [2023] EWHC 1181 (Ch) deals with an application for a disqualification order under s 6 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 against Andrew John Kelly arising out of his conduct as a director of Walmsley Ash Ltd which was wound up by the court on an HMRC petition in 2017. The conduct relied on was that:

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

City Gardens Ltd v DOK82 Ltd [2023] EWHC 1149 (Ch) was a successful appeal against the decision of the district judge below to dismiss a winding up petition on several bases: first that the court had no jurisdiction to make an order because arrangements between the parties were subject to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, secondly because they provided for the application of Hong Kong law rather than English law, thirdly by reason of disputes regarding certain other contractual terms, and finally by reason of an issue as to whether the company had a viable cross claim.