In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

Reid-Roberts & Anor v Mei-Lin & Anor (Re Audun Mar Gudmundsson (a Bankrupt) [2024] EWHC 759 (Ch) was an unusual case resulting in an unusual application of the exceptional circumstances rule in the context of an application by the joint trustees in bankruptcy of Audun Mar Gudmundson for declarations as to the beneficial ownership of his and his ex-wife’s former matrimonial home and orders under s 335A Insolvency Act 1986 for possession and sale.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

Nilsson & Anor v Iqbal & Anor [2024] EWHC 49 (Ch) was an application by the joint trustees in bankruptcy of Mohammed Babar Iqbal for a declaration as to the beneficial ownership and an order for possession and sale of his former matrimonial home, Southview, Pollards Hill East in London. Mr Iqbal, the first respondent, did not appear to resist the trustees’ claim. The second respondent, Mrs Iqbal, did. She was his former wife under Islamic law.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

The application before HHJ Paul Matthews, sitting as Judge of the High Court, in Patley Wood Farm LLP & Ors v Kristina Kicks & Anor [2022] EWHC 2973 (Ch) was essentially a challenge to the decision of trustees in bankruptcy not to intervene in an appeal in possession proceedings between the bankrupts and a Chedington, a creditor, following the purported sale of the bankrupts’ interest in a property known as West Axnoller Cottage.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .