In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

We have blogged a fewtimes about the Supreme Court’s decision in Siegel v. Fitzgerald and its implications.

在终审法院最新颁布的 Re Guy Kwok-hung Lam[2023] HKCFA 9突破性裁决中，终审法院驳回了该案的上诉，并且在判词中就专属管辖权条款（EJC）是否对提交破产呈请有影响这一棘手问题作出裁决，平息了长期对于相关议题的争论。

简而言之，终审法院认可上诉法院大多数法官对于本案的观点，认为一般来说，如果呈请债务的基础争议受制于专属管辖权条款，除非有其他反面因素存在（例如债务人破产的风险将会影响第三方、债务人的呈请以几乎无意义的争议为基础，或者发生滥用法律程序的情况等）， 则法院应驳回该破产呈请。

终审法院在裁定中指出，当只有一名债权人提出破产呈请，而没有证据表明全体债权人都面临风险时，破产制度背后的公共政策因素的重要性则显着降低。

这一裁定反映了法院非常重视当事人自治的原则，以及当事人之间自由达成的协议。该判决将会对破产领域产生深远的影响，以及对处理清算及破产呈请中的仲裁条款产生涟漪效应。

In the latest ground breaking decision in Re Guy Kwok-hung Lam[2023] HKCFA 9, the Court of Final Appeal dismissed the appeal and laid to rest a long-standing debate on the vexing question concerning the impact, if any, exclusive jurisdiction clauses (EJCs) have on the presentation of bankruptcy petitions.

We have previously blogged about Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, a Supreme Court case concerning the scope of the fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . .

In Grant & Ors v FR Acquisitions Corporation (Europe) Ltd & Anor (Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe)) [2022] EWHC 2532 (Ch), the English High Court ruled on an application for directions (the “Application”) made by the administrators (the “Administrators”) of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) relating to the construction and effect of certain bankruptcy-related events of default (“Events of Default”) specified under the ISDA Master Agreements (as defined below), specifically: