The High Court has considered whether trustees in bankruptcy are in breach of sanctions by allowing sanctioned Russian creditors to participate in UK insolvency proceedings.
Background
A Russian national, resident in London is subject to bankruptcy proceedings both in Russia and the UK. The bankrupt's creditors include four Russian banks in liquidation in Russia. The UK trustees in bankruptcy applied to the court for directions concerning three main questions:
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
The liquidator of UKCloud Ltd (the Company) applied to the court for directions as to whether a debenture granted by the Company created a fixed or floating charge over certain internet protocol (IP) addresses. The lender argued that it had a fixed charge.
Fixed or floating?
The High Court considered whether a limitation period could prevent the presentation of a winding up petition based on a Lebanese judgment debt which was not registered as an English judgment.
Background
The creditor presented a winding up petition based on a judgment debt of $776,907.51 obtained in a Lebanese court in 2010. The debtor applied to restrain presentation of the petition on grounds that the judgment had not been registered nor recognised by the English Courts and the claim was time-barred.
Recognition
The English High Court has considered, on appeal, whether a foreign judgment constitutes a "debt" for the purposes of a bankruptcy petition.
Background
A bankruptcy petition served by Servis-Terminal LLC (ST) was based on a Russian court judgment obtained against Drelle, a former director of ST. The judgment had been upheld following appeals to superior courts in Russia.
There was no evidence that Drelle would be able to pay the judgment debt which was considerably more than the bankruptcy threshold.
Appeal
The High court has recently considered whether permission should be given retrospectively to lift an administration moratorium to allow a counterclaim to proceed.
Background
The counterclaim had been brought by WWTAI against CargoLogicAir Ltd (in administration) (CLA) without the consent of the administrators or the Court. CLA contended that the counterclaim was issued in breach of the statutory administration moratorium and should be struck out.
Solely to set off
On 4 March 2024, the High Court approved the amended restructuring plan (the Plan) of Project Lietzenburger Straße Holdco S.à.r.L (the Company) a Luxembourg incorporated company part of the German Aggregate Holdings Group, despite refusing to sanction its original plan.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.