The Federal Court’s recent decision in Kellendonk concerned a $350,000 loan made by the applicants, Mr and Mrs Kellendonk, to Ms Maria Jasienska-Dudek to help her buy a property in Midland, Western Australia (Property). Ms Jasienska-Dudek defaulted under the loan agreement and the parties subsequently entered an informal agreement which, after Ms Jasienska-Dudek became a bankrupt, led to some novel circumstances and a novel application of section 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act).

Cross-border insolvency has ventured into new territory as a judgment is released from the first contemporaneous sitting of the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of New Zealand.

A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.

In Re Octaviar Ltd,^[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland has given a recent example of a settlement considered too ‘good’ to approve, even while noting its failure to achieve perfection.

In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

In Re Cullen Group,[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the determination of a preliminary question regarding the insolvency of Cullen Group Australia Pty Ltd (Cullen Group), which was placed into liquidation approximately four years prior to the hearing date.

In Krejci, in the matter of Union Standard International Group Pty Ltd,[1] the Federal Court provides an example of the ways in which section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .