It’s hard to write a pithy article about the transfer of proceedings from the High Court in London to the Central London County Court (CLCC), but given its wide-reaching implications I thought it was worth a try.
The High Court has approved a £3bn rescue package for Thames Water to plug the leak in the water company's finances while it seeks to secure a wider restructuring deal. This is stage one in Thames Water's plan to restructure its £19bn debt mountain and secure £5bn in equity investment, with the initial cash injection urgently required to service £200m of debt which falls due on 24 March.
In a recent ruling (NMC Health PLC (in Administration) v Ernst & Young LLP [2024] EWHC 2905 (Comm)), the High Court declined to order disclosure of witness statements and transcripts of interviews conducted by administrators during their initial investigations, citing litigation privilege.
Litigation privilege
Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).
How to keep your head above water in the face of economic uncertainty, as told by Lucy Trott, Senior Associate, Stevens & Bolton.
Businesses in turmoil dominate the financial press. That depiction of financial distress is supported by monthly figures which make plain that the financial legacy of the Covid-19 pandemic is an increasing number of insolvencies. It is a trend which does not show any sign of abating.
Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.
What happens to a company at the end of an administration is a question that probably only keeps insolvency anoraks up at night.
There are a limited number of potential options, with the rescue of the company as a going concern being the number one objective to which all administrators aspire. However, more often than not, an administration will end with the company entering liquidation or, where the company has no property to permit a distribution to creditors, the dissolution of the company.
Boris Becker was originally made bankrupt in June 2017. In the ordinary course, a debtor is made bankrupt for a period of one year, and upon the anniversary of the bankruptcy order they are automatically discharged. While a bankrupt is undischarged, they are subject to various restrictions e.g. they are unable to act as company director or be involved in the management, promotion or formation of a business. Once discharged, the debtor can (in theory) start to rebuild their life afresh while their pre-bankruptcy assets remain in the hands of their trustee in bankruptcy (the Trustee).
At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.
In the recent case of Loveridge v Povey and Ors [2024] EWHC 329 (Ch) a company shareholder sought to challenge the administrators’ decision to rescue a balance sheet solvent company as a going concern by securing additional funding, as opposed to pursuing a sale of the business.
Background