Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.
In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
Publicly, Diamond Finance Co. (“Diamond”) provided car loans to individuals with less-than-stellar credit. While Diamond did have “some actual business,” its purpose “quickly became a front to lure unsuspecting investors.”
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox recently found that three Illinois attorneys violated their ethical obligations by failing to return their client’s phone calls. She thus ordered the attorneys to return half of their already-court-approved, and paid, flat fee.
In In re: Dennis Molnar, 19-bk-09525, 2024 WL 190919 (Jan. 17, 2024 N.D, Ill.), the debtor filed a petition seeking relief under chapter 13. Originally, three attorneys from the same firm represented the debtor. The attorneys appeared pursuant to a “no look,” flat-fee program for chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys.
We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
After years of litigation involving state, federal, Irish, and (to a lesser extent) Swiss law; transfers of numerous assets, including Ireland’s priciest-personal residence; a jury trial; and extensive post-trial briefing, the Second Circuit made short shrift of a former real estate mogul and his ex-wife’s appeal of a judgment rendered against them for fraudulent conveyances.
Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.