It’s hard to write a pithy article about the transfer of proceedings from the High Court in London to the Central London County Court (CLCC), but given its wide-reaching implications I thought it was worth a try.

The High Court has approved a £3bn rescue package for Thames Water to plug the leak in the water company's finances while it seeks to secure a wider restructuring deal. This is stage one in Thames Water's plan to restructure its £19bn debt mountain and secure £5bn in equity investment, with the initial cash injection urgently required to service £200m of debt which falls due on 24 March.

In a recent ruling (NMC Health PLC (in Administration) v Ernst & Young LLP [2024] EWHC 2905 (Comm)), the High Court declined to order disclosure of witness statements and transcripts of interviews conducted by administrators during their initial investigations, citing litigation privilege.

Litigation privilege

The Barton doctrine provides that a court-appointed receiver cannot be sued absent “leave of court by which he was appointed.” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).

Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).

How to keep your head above water in the face of economic uncertainty, as told by Lucy Trott, Senior Associate, Stevens & Bolton.

Businesses in turmoil dominate the financial press. That depiction of financial distress is supported by monthly figures which make plain that the financial legacy of the Covid-19 pandemic is an increasing number of insolvencies. It is a trend which does not show any sign of abating.

An appeals court has issued an insightful decision on the availability of damages when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith. See Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC, No. 23-1186, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20286 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024).

The decision addresses both the interplay between Bankruptcy Code sections 303 and 305 and federal preemption of state law.

Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.

We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.