In a recent decision in the Southern District of New York, the court addressed a challenge to a secured-for-unsecured debt exchange offer that raised and answered a host of questions on the potential vulnerability of offers of this type. In Waxman v. Cliffs Natural Resources (SDNY December 6, 2016), the court dealt with standing to pursue a challenge; TIA §316(b) after Marblegate and MeehanCombs/Caesars; the no-action clause and allegations of conflict of interest of the trustee; the remedies clause; and discrimination against non-QIBs.
When a secured creditor appoints a receiver it is usual for them to sign an agreement setting out the terms of the receiver’s appointment, including payment of the receiver’s remuneration, costs and expenses. Appointment documents commonly contain indemnity clauses in which the secured creditor agrees to indemnify the receiver in specified circumstances.
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits action that would deprive individual bondholders of the right to receive principal and interest, has taken center stage of late with rulings on the scope of its applicability. But another provision of Section 316 of the TIA drives in the opposite direction, and is equally fundamental to the architecture of indenture debt as commonly issued in this country. Section 316(a)(1) prescribes the default rule that a majority of bondholders have the power to direct the remedial actions of the trustee.
In our previous bulletin we discussed the ‘safe harbour’ model in the Government’s suggested reforms to the current insolvency laws.
This bulletin considers another of the focus questions in the Proposal Paper: the voiding of ipso facto clauses relating to insolvency events.
Background
On 29 April 2016, the Federal Government released a Proposals Paper titled ‘Improving bankruptcy and insolvency laws’.
The Government is proposing these reforms to encourage entrepreneurship and investment. It hopes to reduce the stigma and detriment around failed business ventures, while still balancing the need to protect creditors.
Where a court has ordered the winding-up of a company, a shareholder may be able to have the winding up terminated under section 482 of the Corporations Act 2001.
Relevant factors
The power of the court to terminate a winding-up is discretionary. Relevant factors to be considered, which are not exhaustive, include the following:
If a director can exercise a right of set-off against a company in liquidation for a debt owed to the director or for a liability of the company to the director (which may be unascertained in amount or contingent), it may help to cancel out or significantly reduce the director’s liability to the company for insolvent trading.
In Allco Funds Management Limited v Trust Co (Re Services) Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1251, an inter-company loan transaction was challenged by a receiver appointed by the secured creditor to one of the companies. Common directors were involved in the transaction. The issue was whether the directors breached their fiduciary duties entitling the company via the receiver to have the transaction set aside.
The background to the case
A debtor company can seek to have a statutory demand set aside if there is a genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the debt, or the company has an offsetting claim.
Because the threshold for contesting a statutory demand is relatively low, a creditor may decide it is better to issue the statutory demand for the undisputed portion of the total debt after making an appropriate allowance for the amount of the total debt in dispute or the amount of the alleged offsetting claim.
When a company is facing short term financial difficulties the directors or shareholders may decide to make a loan to the company to pay wages.