The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.
Summary
On 24 July 2013, the Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgment in the Nortel/Lehman case: Re Nortel Companies [2013] UKSC 52. The Court looked at the position where a contribution notice (CN) or financial support direction (FSD) was issued by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) on a company that is already in insolvency proceedings in England (eg administration). How does the relevant obligation rank in the order of priority of payment?
Snapshot
The Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgment today in the Nortel/Lehman case on where a contribution notice (CN) or financial support direction (FSD) issued by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) on a company that is already in insolvency proceedings (eg administration) ranks in the order of priority of payment.
Summary
The Court of Appeal’s judgment in The Trustees of the Olympic Airlines SA Pension & Life Insurance Scheme v Olympic Airlines SA [2013] EWCA Civ 643 has clarified what is required to fall within the definition of an ‘establishment’ for the purposes of the EC Insolvency Regulation (the Insolvency Regulation).
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).