In re Fencepost Productions Inc. that even though an assignment of voting rights provision in a subordination agreement was not enforceable in a bankruptcy proceeding, a subordinated creditor nevertheless was barred from participating in proceedings related to a chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement on the basis that the subordinated creditor lacked prudential standing.

On August 11, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed lower court decisions rejecting Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (“LBSF”) attempt to recover nearly $1 billion in payments to noteholders and enforcing certain Priority Provisions (defined below) that subordinated payments otherwise payable to LBSF under related swap transactions.

A recent Bankruptcy Court decision, In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., out of the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) by Bankruptcy Judge Sean H.

On December 19, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) affirmed a ruling of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “District Court”) dismissing constructive fraudulent conveyance claims brought by representatives of certain unsecured creditors of Chapter 11 debtor Tribune Company (“Tribune”)

On August 9, 2019, in a unanimous decision (written by a former bankruptcy judge), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the confirmation of the Peabody Energy Chapter 11 plan (“Plan”)¹ with a prominent backstopped rights offering component.

On June 19, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed a ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the “District Court”) dismissing challenges by certain first lien creditors of Texas Competitive Electric Holdings LLC (“TCEH”) to the plan distributions and adequate protection payments made during TCEH’s bankruptcy case.

In Part 1, we discussed how, despite widespread usage, termination in the event of bankruptcy clauses (“ipso facto” clauses) are generally unenforceable pursuant to the bankruptcy code. In this second part, we discuss why these clauses are still prevalent in commercial transactions and the exceptions that allow for enforceability in certain situations.

Why Do Ipso Facto Clauses Remain in Most Contracts?

If ipso facto clauses are generally not enforceable, then why do practically all commercial agreements continue to include them? There are several reasons.

Last year, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Merit, unanimously ruling that a buyout transaction between private parties did not qualify for “safe harbor” protection under Bankruptcy Code section 546(e), on the basis that a “financial institution” acted as an intermediary in the overarching transaction.

Practically all commercial transactions, including licenses, services agreements, and supply agreements, contain a provision that triggers termination rights, without notice, to a party whenever the other party files for bankruptcy or experiences other insolvency-related event. In Part 1 of a two-part series, we discuss how the commonly used termination-on-insolvency clauses are generally unenforceable despite their widespread use.

Standard Ipso Facto Provision

On November 30, 2018, Judge Nelson S. Román of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision affirming the dismissal of certain claims brought by senior secured creditors against junior secured creditors concerning the alleged breach of standstill and turnover provisions in an intercreditor agreement that governed the creditors’ relationship as creditors with recourse to common collateral. SeeIn re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 15-CV-2280 (NSR), 2018 WL 6324842 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Momentive”).