The Bankruptcy Code’s Section 547(b) allows a trustee or debtor in possession to recover property transferred to a creditor, known as a preference action. However, the Code also provides defenses to a preference action, including the ordinary course of business defense.

A Section 363 sale is a sale of a company's assets pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court will approve a 363 sale if the debtor can demonstrate a "substantial business justification" for the sale.

Key Issues

In general, Section 363 bankruptcy sales proceed as follows:

This article, part of our Creditor’s Rights Toolkit [link] series, serves as an essential guide for vendors navigating the complex landscape of dealing with financially distressed or bankrupt customers. It provides a detailed exploration of the options available to vendors who are proactive and quick to act when they learn of their customer’s financial woes.

Successor liability is a catchall term for a group of legal theories that, in certain circumstances, allow a creditor to recover amounts owed by its obligor from a person or entity who succeeds to the assets or business of that obligor. Typically, claimants cannot pursue successor liability against a purchaser in a bankruptcy sale because most sales are made "free and clear" of such claims under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, there are some limited exceptions to this general rule.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

On March 19, in a matter of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Court) held that triangular setoff is not permissible in bankruptcy due to Bankruptcy Code Section 553(a)’s mutuality requirement, and that parties cannot evade that requirement by contracting around it. See In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 990 F.3d 748 (3d Cir. 2021).

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

On January 14, the Supreme Court ruled that more than a mere retention of estate property is needed for a party to violate the automatic stay, vacating and remanding a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019)) that held that the City of Chicago (City) violated the automatic stay by retaining vehicles that were impounded before the filing of the owners’ bankruptcy petitions. See City of Chi. v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021). The decision resolved a split among several circuit courts.

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.