The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
In a recent decision arising out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. (GIT),1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that insurance companies that had issued liability insurance policies to a manufacturer before its bankruptcy filing had standing to object to confirmation of the company’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, even though the plan had been designed to be “insurance neutral” with regard to the policies.
The court has a limited discretion not to make a bankruptcy order where the debt is the subject of a statutory demand which has not been paid and is outstanding at the time of the bankruptcy petition hearing.
In circumstances where a debtor lacks mental capacity to deal with a statutory demand and subsequent bankruptcy petition, the court will rescind or annul a bankruptcy order.
The Insolvency Service has published its policy, which came into effect on 1 December 2010, on realising a bankrupt's principal residence where the Official Receiver (OR) is appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy.
The policy provides that the OR will not take any steps to market the bankrupt's interest in the property for a period of two years and three months from the date of the bankruptcy order. However, the OR can accept any unsolicited offer in relation to the property if it is in the best interest of creditors. After the expiry of the two years and three months:
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.
A notice of intention to appoint administrators (a Notice), although not an absolute bar to making a final charging order, will generally act as a moratorium. This prevents creditors from taking steps to enforce their claims against a company without the permission of the court.
A guarantor can be made bankrupt where the terms of the guarantee create a debt obligation.
The court has held that a statutory demand is valid despite the high default interest rate on an underlying loan.
When a company goes into administration, time does not stop running against its creditors' claims for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980. This is different to where a company goes into liquidation as time does then stop running. The effect there is that the claim stays live whereas in an administration, once the limitation period has expired, the claim is time-barred.