When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
Foreign financial institutions that trade dollar-denominated securities on the secondary market may not appreciate that they could be forced to defend an action arising from such a transaction in a U.S. court. That is what happened, however, to an Austrian bank that purchased a $10 million interest in a syndicated $1.5 billion term loan on the secondary market. In a recent decision, the bankruptcy court in Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-00504 (MG), 2017 WL 632126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
Last month, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York published proposed amendments to its local rules effective December 1, 2016 (the “Proposed Amendments”). Links to the Bankruptcy Court’s notice to the bar with respect to the Proposed Amendments and the full text of the Proposed Amendments are provided below. The Proposed Amendments are currently open for public comment. The comment deadline is November 14, 2016 by 5:00 p.m.
Below is summary of substantive changes effected by the Proposed Amendments which may be of interest to practitioners:
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
On Monday, May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, — S. Ct. —, 2016 WL 2842452 (2016) resolving a split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the scope of the “actual fraud” exception to an individual debtor’s bankruptcy discharge. In relevant part, Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharging “any debt . . . for money, property, [or] services . . . to the extent obtained, by . . .