The Court of Appeal has helpfully confirmed that a judgment creditor can seek an order appointing a receiver by way of equitable execution where:

• the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest in property; and
• execution against the property is not available at law by one of the usual methods, for instance via the sheriff or by a garnishee order.

There was previously doubt as to whether such a receiver could be appointed where the debtor held a legal, as opposed to an equitable interest, in property.

Court:

“You know, every piece of information and fact out there is within six degrees of separation of the debtors’ assets and financial affairs. The question is where do you draw the line?”

4/20/17 Transcript of hearing in In Re SunEdison, Inc., et al, Case No. 16-10992-smb (hereinafter “TR”), page 30 lines 6-11.

The High Court has recently expressed concern that distressed borrowers are being duped into paying money to the anonymous promoters of schemes, which purport to protect them from enforcement by lenders but are actually ‘utterly misguided and spurious’.

There are a number of schemes being promoted at the moment that supposedly protect borrowers in arrears from enforcement by their lender.

Simple retention of title clauses are commonplace and generally effective in contracts for the sale of goods. However, extending their effect to the proceeds of sale of such goods requires careful drafting.

The Court of Appeal has provided some further clarity around the creation and effects of fiduciary obligations in relation to such clauses.[1]

Proceeds of sale clauses

The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.

In McCarthy v Murphy,^[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.

Background

Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:

In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.

In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:

In a recent opinion dated March 29, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on remand from, and following the direction of, the Delaware District Court, ruled that only prepetition unpaid invoices may be counted for purposes of the new value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4). The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that the plaintiff Chapter 7 trustee was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the preference avoidance complaint. Further, the District Court, in affirming the Bankruptcy Court on this point, addressed the ordinary course defense under 11 U.S.C.

A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “District Court”), affirming a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”), further enforces the application of the in pari delicto doctrine in cases decided under New York law and confirms that exceptions to its application remain extremely limited.

Bankruptcy law in Ireland is now, broadly speaking, in line with that of the United Kingdom.

In particular, for bankrupts who cooperate with the bankruptcy process:

• bankruptcy will end in one year; and
• their interest in their family home will re-vest in them after 3 years.

Notably however, the courts will have discretion to extend the period of bankruptcy for up to 15 years for non-cooperative individuals and those who have concealed or transferred assets to the detriment of creditors.