A recent Court of Appeal decision has criticised obiter comments made by the Supreme Court in Bresco v Lonsdale to the effect that adjudication decisions in favour of companies in liquidation could in certain circumstances, and with appropriate safeguards, be enforced by way of summary judgment. The Court of Appeal has indicated that such an approach would be at odds with the mandatory right of set-off arising under the Insolvency Rules. The Court of Appeal’s comments in this respect are themselves obiter and will give rise to uncertainty in this area of the law.

A Court of Appeal decision last week has broadly upheld previous TCC guidance as to the ability of companies in liquidation or those subject to CVAs to commence and enforce adjudication proceedings against their creditors. Although theoretically possible, adjudication proceedings commenced by companies in liquidation are now liable to be restrained by a court injunction.  Adjudications by companies subject to a CVA are more likely to be appropriate and, depending on the circumstances, may be enforced without a stay of execution.

Insolvency set-off: a recap

A recent TCC decision has concluded that the contractor insolvency provisions of the JCT form continue to apply after a termination by the contractor for repudiation. This conclusion may give rise to surprising results and potentially allow an employer to claim from the contractor additional amounts incurred in completing the works with a third party even after termination for the employer’s own default and/or repudiation.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

Last year we reported on a decision of the Scottish Court of Session which suggested that greater leniency may apply to the interpretation of performance bonds in Scotland than in England (see our earlier Law-Now here). A further decision from the Court of Session issued last month would appear to support this trend.

Fife Council v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance plc

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.