There are many enforcement options available to commercial landlords in England & Wales, to recover rent arrears due under a lease from a business tenant. Some of those options are based in contract and governed by the terms of the individual lease itself, such as a power to forfeit or damages for breach, whilst some of those options are based in statute such as the Commercial Rent Arrears Recovery regime.

When an individual or company purchases property in England or Wales, the legal title will transfer once the purchaser is listed as the registered proprietor at the Land Registry. However, what happens when, pending the registration of the legal interest, the seller company (who is still the registered proprietor) is dissolved? This is a risk seldom contemplated when purchasing property, but can have important consequences for the title of the property.

This question had until recent times been a conundrum of modern fixed charge receiverships (as well as receivers appointed under the Law of Property Act 1925), because in the scenario of the receiver seeking to step in and deal with property, the receiver is also said to be the borrower's deemed agent. It therefore begged a thorny question of the receiver, about how to reconcile being on both sides of the possession action.

There are significant differences in the procedures available to lenders north and south of the border when it comes to enforcing fixed charges or standard securities over real/heritable property. In this blog, we will compare the process in England & Wales ("E&W") of appointing a fixed charge or "LPA" receiver with the Scottish calling-up procedure

England & Wales: LPA receivers

Challenging a Tenant CVA

Company Voluntary Agreements ("CVAs") have been the go-to option for struggling retail businesses over the pandemic period. While all creditors are generally treated equally under a CVA, landlords are increasingly finding themselves at the short end where they are the only, or one of, a very small pool of, creditors taking a hit. It is now more important than ever that a landlord knows the circumstances by which they can challenge a tenant's CVA.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.