Introduction

INTRODUCTION 

The Supreme Court has recently in its judgment dated 21 January 2020, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v MSTC Limited [SLP (C) No 20093 of 2019], provided clarity on the interplay between the provisions of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act 1993 (RDB Act) and Limitation Act 1963 (Limitation Act). Supreme Court has in doing so refused to condone a delay of 28 days in filing of a review application by the government borrower entity against a decree in favour of the bank.  

BRIEF BACKGROUND: 

The Supreme Court in its recent decision in K Kishan v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, Civil Appeal No 21825 of 2017, has put to rest the question of whether an arbitral award that has been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) by the award debtor can form the basis for an action under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (NCLAT) on 7 November 2017 passed a judgment in the case of M/s Speculum Plast Private Limited v. PTC Techno Private Limited, putting to rest the question of the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) to the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The present judgment comes in the wake of the decision of the NCLAT in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd.

In a recent decision of M/s Ksheeraabd Constructions Private Limited v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has held that proceedings pending under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) does not constitute a ‘dispute’ under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) and cannot come in the way of initiation of the insolvency resolution process, in terms of Section 9 of the Code.

Background

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.