Payment Orders were originally introduced in the CPC as a fast track route for creditors holding a financial instrument, such as a letter of credit or cheque, to obtain judgment against their debtor for what is a simple and indisputable debt. Payment Orders were rarely issued by the onshore UAE courts. In 2018, Cabinet Resolution No 57 of 2018 (the “2018 Cabinet Resolution”) significantly expanded the scope of application of Payment Orders by extending them to all admitted debts rather than simply those arising out of financial instruments only.

Three recent court decisions address the scope and limits of bankruptcy injunctions barring future asbestos claims. The decisions – from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a Maryland bankruptcy court, and the Montana Supreme Court – underscore that (i) broad notice of proposed injunctions is critical and (ii) channeling injunctions under § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to liabilities that are derivative of the debtor’s liabilities, not to a company’s own liabilities.

States across the country have enacted so-called “reviver” statutes allowing otherwise time-barred claims for childhood sexual abuse to proceed. The statutes vary by jurisdiction, but generally do one of three things: (1) eliminate the statute of limitations for such claims; (2) extend the statute of limitations for such claims; or (3) create a window (e.g., a period of a few years) in which otherwise time-barred claims can be filed.

Only two asbestos bankruptcy cases were filed in 2019 – the lowest number in any one year since Congress enacted the special asbestos bankruptcy trust/channeling injunction statute, Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A Georgia bankruptcy court on April 17 issued a significant ruling that breaks new ground concerning how future claimants’ representatives in asbestos bankruptcies (FCRs) are chosen. In In re The Fairbanks Co., Case No. 18-41768-PWB (Bankr. N.D. Ga.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.