“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

The Supreme Court of the United States denied a petition for writ of certiorari of the debtor, Castleton Plaza, LP, in Castleton Plaza, LP v. EL-SNPR Notes Holdings, LLC, Case No. 12-1422, meaning the prior opinion from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In the Matter of Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2013), remains intact, protecting creditors who are faced with being shortchanged by a reorganization plan proposed by a debtor that attempts to transfer the future ownership of the debtor to an insider without first putting the ownership stake up for auction.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).