“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

In September 2014 administrators were appointed over Strada restaurants (trading under SSRL Realisations Limited). The restaurant was tenant of a unit in a shopping centre in Bloomsbury.

Mistaken discharge of land mortgages and rectification atthe Land Registry – can a discharged mortgage secure asubsequent advance?

It is well-established law that a mortgage can be used to secure further advances made by a lender. What happens when a registered mortgage is mistakenly discharged at the Land Registry however? Can it be rectified and used as security for a subsequent advance? NRAM Plc v Evans and another - 2015 EWHC 1543 explores the issues.

We all know that statutory demand can be issued for undisputed debts in excess of £750, and if not satisfied for 21 days, the stat demand is prima facie evidence of insolvency. What happens where there are multiple dents of less than £750 each however? Howell v Lerwick Commercial Mortgage Corporation Ltd [2015] EWHC 1177 (Ch) provides an insight.

The background

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

In Mark Howell v Lerwick Commercial Mortgage Corporation Limited, the High Court has held that statutory demands will not necessarily be set aside if the undisputed debt is less than £750, where there other debts which would take the cumulative total over this limit.

Facts

Mr Howell obtained finance from Lerwick in 2010 to develop a property and paid £2,750 to Lerwick to obtain a valuation. Mr Howell claimed that the valuation provided was sub-standard, and as a result there were delays in the development and its subsequent sale.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.