Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

On 22 January 2014 the High Court ordered the winding up of a property company, Fuerta Limited, on the unusual ground that it was just and equitable to do so. Resort to this ground for winding up is usually reserved for the most intractable of situations and it is thought to be the first time the Court has done so on foot of a creditor petition.  

Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”).

On 24 December 2013 the Companies (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 was signed into law by the President.  The purpose of the legislation is to expedite a number of amendments to existing legislation pending the enactment of the Companies Bill.

Circuit Court Examinership

Borrowers are increasingly seeking to challenge or frustrate the validity of an appointment of a receiver on technical grounds. While each case will be determined on its own merits and facts, a recent decision of the High Court is illustrative of the Court’s attitude towards some such arguments.

A number of recent High Court decisions suggest an increase in the number of interlocutory applications being brought by receivers seeking to obtain vacant possession of the properties over which they have been appointed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).

Cramdown Plan Stays Suits Against Corporate Parent

In In re Kerr Aluminium Ltd (In Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IEHC 386, the High Court dismissed an application by a liquidator that certain payments made by the company in favour of Bank of Ireland be deemed a fraudulent preference within the meaning of section 286 of the Companies Act 1963. The decision is a further reminder of the challenges liquidators face in establishing a dominant intention to prefer one creditor over another in fraudulent preference applications.