Over the decade since the implementation of the costs reforms proposed in Lord Jackson's Review of Civil Litigation Costs, lawyers and litigants have become accustomed to the courts actively managing the costs of disputes with a value up to £10 million. But the court also retains a discretion to apply the costs management regime in cases even above this level.

Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.

Navigating the Bankruptcy Code can present many traps for unsuspecting debtors, creditors, or asset buyers. The Delaware District Court recently reminded bankruptcy participants of an often overlooked pitfall involving the collision between (i) an unstayed bankruptcy sale order authorizing an asset sale free and clear of successor liability and (ii) federal labor law imposing successor liability on the buyer. See United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Buyer Alloy Steel LLC, Civ. No.

The Court of Appeal recently considered when precisely a company had given a preference within the meaning of the Insolvency Act 1986 – a question of timing which may impact on whether an insolvency practitioner can later unwind the preferential treatment for the benefit of creditors as a whole.

Here we look at what a preference is, and when it is deemed to be given.

Preferences

In a recent decision in the high value bankruptcy of Pramod Mittal (Mr Mittal), the Chancery division considered the rules on service of insolvency applications. The decision underlines the importance of adhering to service rules and giving as much notice as possible of insolvency applications.

Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.