Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.

Navigating the Bankruptcy Code can present many traps for unsuspecting debtors, creditors, or asset buyers. The Delaware District Court recently reminded bankruptcy participants of an often overlooked pitfall involving the collision between (i) an unstayed bankruptcy sale order authorizing an asset sale free and clear of successor liability and (ii) federal labor law imposing successor liability on the buyer. See United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Buyer Alloy Steel LLC, Civ. No.

The Court of Appeal has unanimously overturned an unlawful preference ruling from the High Court, finding instead that the repayment of inter-company debt did not amount to a preference because, at the time the operative decision to make the repayment occurred, there was no desire to prefer.

In two recent blog posts we discussed the challenge made to the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) of Mizen Build/Design Ltd (the “Company”) by Peabody Construction Limited (“Peabody”) and the finding of (i) a material irregularity based on failure to disclose information to creditors in the CVA proposal, and (ii) unfair prejudice based on vote swamping.

In a previous blog about the case of Mizen we considered the case from the point of view of “guarantee stripping”, looking at how the CVA dealt with those claims. However, the CVA was challenged on a number of bases, including whether it was unfairly prejudicial as a consequence of “vote swamping”.

In this blog, we look at that aspect of the case.

A company voluntary arrangement (CVA) is a tool which has been widely utilised by companies seeking to restructure and compromise liabilities.

In recent years CVAs have been in the limelight because of attacks by landlords who feel that they have been unfairly prejudiced by the CVA terms. Largely, challenges such as those to the Regis and New Look CVAs have been unsuccessful, but arguments about unfair prejudice based on “vote swamping” were left open for future debate.

Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.