The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.
One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.
In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.
There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.
引子
将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“新《公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“未及时履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“董事怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将再次对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则带来冲击。
引子
将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“《新公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“怠于履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则再次带来冲击。
回望我国立法沿革，在超过三十年的时间中，对于“清算义务人”及“怠于清算责任”的规定修订之繁多、体系之冲突、解释之模糊，遍观整个民商事法律体系都属罕见，并由此引发了大量“类案不同判”的现象。鉴此，笔者将结合《新公司法》的最新修改，对涉及“清算义务人”和“怠于清算责任”的规定进行系统回顾及梳理，并以此为基础对《新公司法》的新修亮点及溯及力问题进行初步分析，抛砖引玉，并求教于业界。
一、《新公司法》之前我国法律对于“清算义务人”与“怠于清算责任”的立法沿革
（一）2005年《公司法》修订之前的相关规定
Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL
Recently, two significant distressed companies with thousands of commercial leases, Rite Aid and WeWork, each filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, seeking in part to rationalize their geographic footprints through the rejection of a substantial portion of their lease portfolios.
In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.