The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL

Recently, two significant distressed companies with thousands of commercial leases, Rite Aid and WeWork, each filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, seeking in part to rationalize their geographic footprints through the rejection of a substantial portion of their lease portfolios.

In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.

随着国际形势与经济环境日益复杂严峻，中资美元债市场动荡加剧，频频爆雷，违约数量和金额不断创历史新高。本系列文章第二部分系从英国法和中国内地法探讨中资美元债所涉增信措施——维好协议。对此，笔者已在第二部分上篇中与各位读者分享了英国法下维好协议的效力判定等问题，下篇则将视角回归中国内地法，探寻以下问题：维好协议是否具有约束力？是否构成保证担保？涉及维好协议的域外裁判能否获得中国内地法院的承认与执行？以期为妥善处理和解决适用中国内地法的相关争议探寻参考路径。

第二部分 发债增信担保措施之——维好协议（下）

3. 维好协议在中国内地法律及司法实践中的归类与定性

3.1. 维好协议的产生背景及最新监管政策

Restructurings defy a one-size fits all approach because every deal is unique and different tools are required to solve different problems. At one end of the restructuring continuum is the so-called “amend and extend,” where the credit agreement is amended to provide incremental liquidity, extend near-term maturities, modify covenants or some combination of the foregoing. This approach is fast and cost-efficient, but limited in its impact. At the other end of the spectrum is a restructuring through chapter 11.