The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.

One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

国有企业重组是指通过收购、划转、合并、分立、资产剥离、混改（包括科改）等方式，对国有企业进行重新组织，以实现资源优化配置、企业整体竞争力提升的效果。其中，公司分立是一种常见的重组模式，多适用于分拆上市、解决同业竞争、突出主营业务等场景。笔者结合近期项目经验，就国有企业以分立方式实施重组所涉及的相关法律问题进行探讨。

一、公司分立的基本流程及国企分立特别程序

根据《关于做好公司合并分立登记支持企业兼并重组的意见》（工商企字〔2011〕226号）第二条[1]，公司分立是一个公司分成两个或两个以上的公司，包括存续分立和新设分立两种形式。存续分立是一个公司分立成两个以上公司，本公司继续存续，同时设立一个及以上新的公司。新设分立是一个公司分立为两个及以上新的公司，本公司解散。无论采用哪种形式的分立，公司分立前的债务均由分立后的公司承担连带责任。公司分立的常规流程包括制定分立方案、通过分立决议、编制资产负债表和财产清单、签订分立协议、公告及通知债权人及办理公司分立登记。将于2024年7月1日施行的新修订《公司法》增加了“国家企业信用信息公示系统”作为公告的平台（不再仅限于登报公告），其余关于分立的规定并无实质性变化。

在我国商事实践中，由于清算相关主体未必能严格履行清算义务，以及解散清算制度本身的不完备性等原因，导致存在大量公司自行解散清算并注销，却仍遗留部分债务未处理的情况。此时债务人的公司法人人格已经终止，不再是民事责任承担主体，债权人只能选择其他主体主张权利，这无疑增加了债权追偿的难度，在司法实践中引发了大量争议。

2024年7月1日，新《公司法》即将实施，新法一方面对现行的解散清算制度进行了优化，明确了以董事为主的清算主体责任；另一方面则强化了股东的出资责任，特别规定股东的最长认缴出资期限为五年，且要求存量公司逐步调整至该期限内，这预计将引发大量未实缴出资的公司通过解散清算程序进行注销，从而带来更多公司注销后遗留债务的追偿难题。基于这种新形势，笔者根据近年来代理不良债权追偿项目的经验，梳理并归纳了对遗留债务的追偿路径，以期为面临类似情况的债权人提供参考和借鉴。

一、《公司法》修订与遗留债务的追偿现状

Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL

Recently, two significant distressed companies with thousands of commercial leases, Rite Aid and WeWork, each filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, seeking in part to rationalize their geographic footprints through the rejection of a substantial portion of their lease portfolios.

In our prior alert over the summer, we highlighted the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., 279 A.3d 323, 329 (Del.