On Jan. 10, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al., capped a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at only $25 million (the amount it paid to purchase the claim). The decision is on appeal. While the Court stated that its decision is non-precedential, it serves as a cautionary tale for secured lenders who also are potential acquirers of a debtor’s assets in bankruptcy sales.

Facts

Loan to Fisker

A New York bankruptcy court, on Dec. 12, 2013, issued a 166-page decision after a 34-day trial, concluding that the spin-off of a highly profitable energy business constituted a fraudulent transfer intended to shield the business from massive environmental liabilities, and awarding damages of up to approximately $14.5 billion.^[1]Tronox Inc. et al. v. Kerr McGee et al. (In re Tronox et al.) (Bankruptcy S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (J.

On Sept. 12, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny payment of a make-whole premium (the “Make-Whole Amount”) to bondholders under three separate indentures (the “Indentures”) based on the plain language of those agreements. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. et al. (In re AMR Corp.), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4840474 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (“In re AMR Corp. II”).

A lender’s right to recover a make-whole premium as part of its allowed claim in a bankruptcy case has been the subject of several recent court decisions. A Delaware bankruptcy court recently allowed a make-whole premium of $23.7 million on a $67 million term loan^[1] and found that the premium was not “plainly disproportionate” to the creditor’s possible loss. As a result, the make-whole was not an unenforceable penalty under New York law. In re School Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, Slip Op. (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013).^[2]

Facts

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an insider preference complaint by Capmark Financial Group Inc. and its affiliates ("Capmark") seeking to recover a $145 million pre-bankruptcy payment from a lender group. Capmark Financial Group Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 1420243 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the Eighth Circuit held on March 25, 2013, that a lender “lost its possessory lien when it turned the Debtor’s account funds over to the Trustee without first seeking adequate protection.” In re WEB2B Payment Solutions, Inc., _____ B.R. 2013 _____, 2013WL 1188041, *5 (8^th Cir. B.A.P. March 25, 2013) (emphasis added).

Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]

As NASA engineers breathe a sigh of relief after the “seven minutes of terror” that was the rover Curiosity’s landing on Mars, recipients of payments under commodity forward contracts can—at least in the Fifth Circuit—rest assured that agreements that meet the basic definition of forward contract contained in section 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Code will be protected from preference liability should their counterparties find themselves in bankruptcy. Last Thursday, in Lightfoot v. MXEnegry Electric, Inc. (In re MBS Management Servs., Inc.). No. 11-30553 (5th Cir. Aug.

Chapter 11 creditors’ committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders’ prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions.

Chapter 11 creditors' committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders' prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions. This Alert focuses on two of these recent decisions:In re Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 2017952 (9th Cir.