On January 27, 2020, FERC petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) for rehearing en banc of that court’s decision finding bankruptcy court-FERC concurrent jurisdiction over certain power purchase agreements. Notwithstanding such concurrent jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit’s decision finds that the bankruptcy court’s concurrent jurisdiction is paramount, and that therefore, FERC-jurisdictional power purchase agreements are susceptible to rejection in bankruptcy.

In orders issued on January 25 and 28, 2019, FERC concluded that the Commission and the bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to review and address the disposition of FERC-jurisdictional contracts sought to be rejected through bankruptcy and, therefore, a party to a FERC-jurisdictional wholesale power agreement must first obtain approval from both FERC and the bankruptcy court to modify the filed rate and reject the filed wholesale power contract, respectively. FERC made its determination in response to two separate petitions (“Petitions”) filed by NextEra Energy, Inc.

On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.

Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

In the recent decision of In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), Judge Sontchi held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to counsel to the creditors committee in a case with a confirmed chapter 11 plan.