Restructuring Plans: should an opposing creditor be granted security for costs? Might that open the floodgates where companies are by definition “distressed,” or was this particular Plan more akin to ordinary adversarial litigation? Read our summary below.

The judgment of Adam Johnson J in Re Great Annual Savings Company Ltd, (Re Companies Act 2006) [2023] EWHC 1141 (Ch) demonstrates again the rigorous approach the courts are taking in relation to the fulfilment of the conditions required to “cram down” dissenting creditors in restructuring plans as well as in the exercise of the court’s discretion to sanction them.

NGI Systems & Solutions Ltd v The Good Box Co Labs Ltd [2023] EWHC 274 (Ch) records the court’s reasons for sanctioning a restructuring plan made between the defendant company, The Good Box Co Labs Limited, its members, and separate classes of its creditors pursuant to section 901F Companies Act 2006. It also deals with other matters arising out of the company’s administration.

Despite the “elegance” of the arguments challenging  the calling of creditors’ meetings on behalf of the former CEO, who argued that the rights of “B” shareholders including himself, would be adversely affected, Trower J found that as neither the contractual terms of the rights themselves nor their economic value would be affected by the plans, he would order calling of the meetings under section 901C(3) Companies Act 2006. There was no real change to the economic value for the B shareholders.  

On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.