The Ninth Circuit on June 1 affirmed a key bankruptcy principle that liens may survive and “pass through” the bankruptcy process even if the underlying claim secured by the lien is disallowed. The facts in Lane v. The Bank of New York Mellon (Ninth Cir. Ct. Of Appeals, No. 18-60059, June 1, 2020) are all too familiar – a mortgage loan originated by Countrywide Home Loans wound up in a huge pool of securities with The Bank of New York Mellon serving as trustee for the certificate holders. Countrywide had endorsed the promissory note in blank, which made it payable to the bearer.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Appraisal Institute issued guidance to its MAI appraisers regarding the new challenges and limitations on rendering an opinion of real estate value in the wake of a disaster when markets are unstable or chaotic[1].
Among the only certainties for the post-COVID lending world is the uncertainty of commercial real estate values. Among the classes of real estate that surely will be immediately diminished in value are hospitality and most brick and mortar retail, but even the value of industrial and office properties will be closely scrutinized as questions are posed regarding changes in how companies conduct their businesses and which types of businesses will recover most fully.
On July 6-7, 2017, Craig Jalbert, in his capacity as Trustee for F2 Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 187 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending on the nature of the claims). In certain instances, the Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On June 15, 2017, Curtis R. Smith, as Liquidating Trustee of the Hastings Creditors’ Liquidating Trust, filed approximately 69 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On June 13, 2017, The Original Soupman, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively “Debtors” or “Original Soupman”) commenced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to its petition, Original Soupman estimates that its assets are between $1 million and $10 million, and its liabilities are between $10 million and $50 million.
On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.
Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).