The Court of Appeal has helpfully confirmed that a judgment creditor can seek an order appointing a receiver by way of equitable execution where:

• the debtor holds a legal or equitable interest in property; and
• execution against the property is not available at law by one of the usual methods, for instance via the sheriff or by a garnishee order.

There was previously doubt as to whether such a receiver could be appointed where the debtor held a legal, as opposed to an equitable interest, in property.

The High Court has recently expressed concern that distressed borrowers are being duped into paying money to the anonymous promoters of schemes, which purport to protect them from enforcement by lenders but are actually ‘utterly misguided and spurious’.

There are a number of schemes being promoted at the moment that supposedly protect borrowers in arrears from enforcement by their lender.

Simple retention of title clauses are commonplace and generally effective in contracts for the sale of goods. However, extending their effect to the proceeds of sale of such goods requires careful drafting.

The Court of Appeal has provided some further clarity around the creation and effects of fiduciary obligations in relation to such clauses.[1]

Proceeds of sale clauses

There has been considerable controversy about the extent of the powers, and the extent of obligations of a business rescue practitioner in relation to a cession of book debts by the company in rescue.

This is an important issue in business rescue because most financially distressed companies have an overdraft facility with a bank which is secured by a cession of debtors. Many practitioners want or need to use the overdraft facility as working capital.

Cession (generally)

Since the inception of business rescue, misconduct by business rescue practitioners (BRPs) has been one of the biggest causes of complaint (and headaches) by creditors. More and more disgruntled creditors and other affected persons are pursuing the removal of rogue BRPs of companies in business rescue.

In terms of section 139 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a BRP may only be removed from office in terms of section 130, or as provided for in section 139. Furthermore, only the court is authorised to remove a BRP from office, both in terms of sections 130 and 139.

The High Court has reiterated that cross-examination will not generally be permitted on an interlocutory application, or where there is no conflict of fact on the affidavits.

In McCarthy v Murphy,^[1] the defendant mortgagor was not permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff (a receiver) or a bank employee who swore a supporting affidavit.

Background

Two recent judgments have brought further clarity in relation to the rights acquirers of loan portfolios to enforce against borrowers:

In AIB Mortgage Bank -v- O'Toole & anor [2016] IEHC 368 the High Court determined that a bank was not prevented from relying on a mortgage as security for all sums due by the defendants, despite issuing a redemption statement which omitted this fact.

In order to understand this case, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events:

Bankruptcy law in Ireland is now, broadly speaking, in line with that of the United Kingdom.

In particular, for bankrupts who cooperate with the bankruptcy process:

• bankruptcy will end in one year; and
• their interest in their family home will re-vest in them after 3 years.

Notably however, the courts will have discretion to extend the period of bankruptcy for up to 15 years for non-cooperative individuals and those who have concealed or transferred assets to the detriment of creditors.

Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.