Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.

Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?

The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue

The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.

It is common practice to find directors of a company standing surety for the company in order to secure its debts. The consequence could be severe for the sureties, because if the company is unable to pay its debt, the creditor can take legal action against the directors or other third parties in their capacity as sureties, unless the company pays its debts and the sureties are released from liability.

Section 153 (1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) is intended to afford a remedy to affected persons who support a business rescue plan that has been 

The section can be broken down into five key elements:

In this article we investigate whether, in South African law, a subordination agreement could constitute a "voidable disposition" as defined in section 26 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the Act). 
 
Section 26 of the Act provides that every disposition of property not made for value may be set aside by the court, if the disposition was made by an insolvent (whether an individual, company or close corporation) either: 
 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago has issued a decision with significant implications for licensees of trademarks whose licensors become debtors in bankruptcy. In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, the Court considered whether rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy deprives the licensee of the right to use the licensed mark.¹ Disagreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

The Trustee overseeing the liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“Lehman”) in the U.S. and the Joint Administrator of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (“LB Europe”) in the U.K. have reached an agreement in principle to resolve $38 billion in asserted claims among Lehman, LB Europe and subsidiaries and affiliates. The agreement is subject to definitive documentation and approval by the Bankruptcy Court in New York and the English High Court. The parties set December 15, 2012 as the deadline to reach a final agreement.

In the Summer 2009 issue of the Legal Canvas, we wrote about the wisdom of filing a UCC financing statement when art work is consigned to a gallery. Specifically, we said that the filing of a financing statement that reflects the consignor’s interest in the work provides protection against the gallery’s creditors. Financing statements take no time to prepare and cost less than $50 to file.

It could be money well spent.

U.S. bankruptcy law permits debtors-in-possession and trustees to sell assets free and clear of claims, liens and other interests. But a federal judge in New York ruled recently that a purchaser does not necessarily buy free and clear when a product manufactured pre-bankruptcy causes injury after a sale closes. Morgan Olson L.L.C. v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), No. 11 Civ. 2291, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44314 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012) (JPO). In this situation, the purchaser can remain liable for injuries caused by the asset purchased from the debtor.