Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), was enacted to inter alia provide a consolidated framework to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner and to maximise the value of assets. This objective is further aided by a moratorium under Section 14 that halts legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, and the immunity provision under Section 32A, which offers a fresh slate to resolution applicants upon plan approval.

When a company is in financial distress, directors face difficult choices. Should they trade on to try to “trade out” of the company’s financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they act too soon, will creditors complain that they should have done more to save the business? A recent English High Court case raises the prospect of directors potentially being held to account for decisions that “merely postpone the inevitable.”

A Hong Kong court has refused to sanction a scheme of arrangement, saying that practitioners should explain the key terms and effect of any proposed restructuring in a way which can be easily understood by the creditors and the court.

In Re Sino Oiland Gas Holdings Ltd [2024] HKCFI 1135, the Honourable Madam Justice Linda Chan refused to sanction a scheme of arrangement, saying that creditors had been given insufficient information about the restructuring and the scheme that would enable them to make an informed decision at the scheme meeting.

Introduction

For initiating proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”), categorisation of a creditor as either a “financial creditor” or an “operational creditor” is a rather significant first step. Such categorisation is not merely organisational, but essential since the rights, obligations and procedural requirements for realisation of debt by financial and operational creditors also differ under the IBC.

The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has finally laid to rest the vexed issue of whether an arbitration agreement or a winding-up petition should take precedence in an insolvency situation. In two parallel decisions, the Court of Appeal ruled that an arbitration agreement should be treated in the same way as an exclusive jurisdiction clause and that the principle should be given a wide interpretation.

The Hong Kong High Court has given a rare order for modifications to a scheme of arrangement after it had been implemented incorrectly by the scheme administrators. Drawing on instances in which the English courts have sanctioned modifications after approval by scheme creditors, the court held that the same principles apply here.

Introduction

Group Insolvency: Introduction

Group means two or more enterprises, which directly or indirectly are in a position to exercise 26% or more voting rights in other enterprise or appoint more than 50% members of the Board of Directors in the other enterprise or control the management or affairs of the other enterprise.[1]

The Hong Kong court has granted an order forcing an uncooperative former director of a Hong Kong listed company to ratify the appointment of a Hong Kong liquidator as the sole director of the companies' four BVI subsidiaries. The court rejected the idea that the liquidators should be made to apply for fresh winding up orders in the BVI and stressed that courts should be ready to offer each other mutual assistance.