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On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.

Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 introduces a temporary, retrospective suspension of the directors' personal financial liability for wrongful trading from 1 March 2020 until 30 September 2020. This is not a blanket defence to a breach of duty by directors, since the directors' general duties to act in the best interests of the company (or, on insolvency, its creditors),will continue to apply.

On 26 June the long-awaited Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 came into force and introduced emergency measures to provide protection to directors of companies which continue to trade notwithstanding the threat of insolvency, and to prevent, where possible, companies entering into insolvency due to COVID-19.

On 26 June, the long-awaited Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 became law providing the UK (but with separate provisions for Northern Ireland) with temporary and permanent changes to insolvency law aimed at helping businesses manage the economic implications of COVID-19 including:

Permanent measures

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.