On September 20, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California (“Court”) confirmed a plan for a cannabis-related business (“Debtor”) to sell its equity interests in a Canadian cannabis company, Lowell Farms, and distribute the proceeds to its creditors.

As the cannabis industry matures, there will be winners and losers. Losers lack access to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Marijuana related assets cannot be sold free and clear of liens and encumbrances via the tried and true bankruptcy section 363 sale, which leaves the loser’s creditors without the best tool to maximize the value of the loser’s assets, and deprives acquirers of a federal court order conveying assets. What’s the state of play, and what’s the alternative for the losers, their creditors, and the companies that would acquire them?

STATE OF PLAY

Bank Asset Auction: Bids for Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. (“SVB”) and its subsidiary Silicon Valley Private Bank, together or separately, in whole or in part, are due by Wednesday, March 22, 2023 at 8 p.m. and Friday, March 24, 2023 at 8 p.m. We’ve previously reported that SVB is open for operations for a minimum of ninety days until it is sold or liquidated.

The FDIC has statutory obligations to maximize the net present value return from the sale or disposition of the assets entrusted to it as receiver, and to minimize the amount of any loss realized.[1] Today we examine the FDIC’s efforts to fulfill its mandate through the transfer of assets to bridge-banks, Silicon Valley Bank, N.A. (“SVB”) and Signature Bank, N.A. (“SB”).

The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.

On March 31, 2020, the Rhode Island Superior Court announced the creation of its COVID-19 Receivership Program. The Program establishes a unique non-liquidating receivership calendar intended to assist Rhode Island businesses that are unable to pay their debts as they become due as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. The Program is designed to give struggling businesses time to obtain emergency funding under the CARES Act or other source, to resume paying its ongoing obligations under Court supervision, and repay its prepetition debt.

A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.

Regan v Brougham [2019] NZCA 401 clarifies what is needed to establish a valid guarantee.

A Term Loan Agreement was entered into whereby Christine Regan and Mark Tuffin lent $50,000 to B & R Enterprises Ltd. Rachael Dey and Bryce Brougham were named as Guarantors. Bryce Brougham was the only guarantor to sign the agreement. The Company was put into liquidation and a demand made against the Guarantor.

The guarantor argued that the guarantee was not enforceable based on the following: