In earlier posts, the Red Zone has discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), which held that increased U.S. Trustee quarterly fees for large Chapter 11 debtors between 2018 and 2020 under the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017 (the “2017 Act”) were unconstitutional because of disparate treatment of Chapter 11 debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator (“BA”) districts, and subsequent judicial decisions determining the appropriate remedy for debtors who overpaid those fees.
We have previously discussed the growing list of judicial decisions addressing the appropriate remedy for overpayment of U.S. Trustee (“UST”) quarterly fees. In U.S. Tr. Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP (In re Mosaic Mgmt. Grp., Inc.), No. 20-12547, 2023 WL 4144557 (11th Cir.
In a unanimous decision handed down on Feb. 22, 2023, the Supreme Court reinforced one of the Bankruptcy Code’s important creditor protections. In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S. ___ (2023), the Court confirmed, in an opinion authored by Justice Barrett, that the Bankruptcy Code bars the discharge by individual debtors of debts fraudulently obtained by the debtor’s agent or business partner.
Payment Orders were originally introduced in the CPC as a fast track route for creditors holding a financial instrument, such as a letter of credit or cheque, to obtain judgment against their debtor for what is a simple and indisputable debt. Payment Orders were rarely issued by the onshore UAE courts. In 2018, Cabinet Resolution No 57 of 2018 (the “2018 Cabinet Resolution”) significantly expanded the scope of application of Payment Orders by extending them to all admitted debts rather than simply those arising out of financial instruments only.
The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.
A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.
The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.
Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.
In Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy v PAG Asset Preservation Ltd [2019] EWHC 2890 the Secretary presented petitions under s 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 to wind up two companies on public interest grounds. These companies were PAG Asset Preservation Limited and MB Vacant Property Solutions Limited (the Companies).
The Privy Council has rejected an attempt to block a cross-border liquidation on procedural grounds in UBS AG New York v Fairfield Sentry [2019] UKPC 20.
The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.