There are few things as daunting to a vendor or supplier as its counterparty’s bankruptcy. The likelihood of a significantly discounted recovery for goods and services provided and potential loss of a customer may have long-lasted impacts on profitability. Even worse, however, is the prospect that payments received in good faith prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing may be at risk of recoupment. In this alert, we address the risk that such payments are voidable as preferential transfers.

Unitranche financing began as a middle-market product, tracing its origins to the days of recovery from the global credit crisis. The credit markets re-opened with an explosion of available capital from traditional lenders, business development companies and other direct lenders. With an increasing supply of capital, leverage shifted to borrowers and private equity, allowing them to better dictate the terms and conditions of their loan facilities. With the greater prevalence of so-called “covenant-lite” loans, also came the exponential growth of the unitranche market.

The merchant cash advance (“MCA”) industry recently provided two different bankruptcy courts with an opportunity to consider the characterization of MCA funding transactions as either “true sales” of receivables or “disguised loans”.

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia with relatively few variations, sets out, among other things, the rules to be followed when obtaining a security interest in personal property collateral to secure a loan. The basic premise of Article 9 is that if the lender follows the rules, it should be protected against third parties, including other creditors or a bankruptcy trustee, who would seek to challenge the lender’s security interest or the priority of the security interest.

In its much-discussed decision, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2020), the Supreme Court ruled that the City of Chicago (“City”) was not in violation of Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code for failing to release an impounded car to a debtor in bankruptcy.

Periodically courts remind corporate directors that their decisions to act or to refrain from acting during the course of managing the affairs of a corporation are not without limitations. It is well established that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties, and more specifically, a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to corporate shareholders. Those duties should always be at the front of mind of every director when any action or inaction is contemplated, but in particular, when addressing challenging issues facing the corporation.

The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.

A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

The High Court in DHC Assets Ltd v Arnerich [2019] NZHC 1695 recently considered an application under s 301 of the Companies Act (the Act) seeking to recover $1,088,156 against the former director of a liquidated company (Vaco). The plaintiff had a construction contract with Vaco and said it had not been paid for all the work it performed under that contract.