Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Today, in Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, the Supreme Court held that debtors who paid fees in bankruptcy cases administered by the U.S. Trustee Program are not entitled to any relief, even though the Court previously ruled that those debtors had been unconstitutionally overcharged. This decision is the culmination of several years of litigation concerning differential fee structures across judicial districts.

This morning, the Supreme Court decided Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., which clarifies that any party with a "direct financial stake in the outcome" of a reorganization has standing as a "party in interest" to object to a Chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. 1109(b). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor held that the debtor's insurer has standing to object even if the plan purports to preserve the insurer's legal rights and thus is said to be "insurance neutral."

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.

A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

In Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy v PAG Asset Preservation Ltd [2019] EWHC 2890 the Secretary presented petitions under s 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 to wind up two companies on public interest grounds. These companies were PAG Asset Preservation Limited and MB Vacant Property Solutions Limited (the Companies).

The Privy Council has rejected an attempt to block a cross-border liquidation on procedural grounds in UBS AG New York v Fairfield Sentry [2019] UKPC 20.