Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The Privy Council has handed down judgment in two appeals (ETJL v Halabi; ITGL v Fort Trustees [2022] UKPC 36) concerning the nature and scope of the right of a trustee to recover from or be indemnified out of trust assets in respect of liabilities and other expenditure properly incurred by the trustee. A seven-member Board was convened because the Privy Council was asked to reconsider part of its decision in Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd v Glenalla Properties Ltd [2019] AC 271.
Last Friday, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Al Jaber v Mitchell [2021] EWCA Civ 1190, a keenly awaited decision which considers with the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit to statements given by a former director during an examination under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986.
The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.
The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.
The Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 has brought much needed clarity to the legal basis and scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ principle. The effect of the decision is a ‘bright line’ rule that bars claims by shareholders for loss in value of their shares arising as a consequence of the company having suffered loss, in respect of which the company has a cause of action against the same wrong-doer.
A recent decision of the High Court of New Zealand provides helpful guidance for insolvency practitioners on how aspects of the voluntary administration regime should operate in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 30 March 2020, the board of directors of EncoreFX (NZ) Limited resolved to appoint administrators to the company. By then, New Zealand was already at Level 4 on the four-level alert system for COVID-19.
The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.
Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.
In Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy v PAG Asset Preservation Ltd [2019] EWHC 2890 the Secretary presented petitions under s 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 to wind up two companies on public interest grounds. These companies were PAG Asset Preservation Limited and MB Vacant Property Solutions Limited (the Companies).